Samuel Hollifield - Analysis and Defense of Automotive Networks

Recorded on May 1st, 2020 at the 6th annual BSides Knoxville (virtual this year) conference Modern vehicles are critically vulnerable. They rely on many electronic computers and sensors which communicate by broadcasting critical information over many Controller Area Networks (CANs). CANs are required by legislation on modern vehicles for emission and diagnostic purposes. Previous research has shown that a vehicle’s network has dangerous implications—hackers can collect data from remote vehicles and even disrupt vehicle control. Although automotive manufacturers are evolving to protect against these intrusions, the practical application of cybersecurity in the field remains inconsistent. This talk will detail current efforts by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory to use mathematics in order to secure automotive networks. We will discuss the background of CAN and technical details such as error handling, message queuing, and arbitration conflicts. Further, we will dive into the world of automotive intrusion detection to learn about different defensive techniques and approaches to secure vehicular systems as a whole.